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ABSTRACT: The paper develops a classificatory system of basic argument types on the basis of the epis-
temological approach to argumentation. This approach has provided strict rules for several kinds of argu-
ments. These kinds may be brought into a system of basic irreducible types, which rely on different parts of 
epistemology: deductive logic, probability theory, utility theory. The system reduces a huge mass of differ-
ent argument schemes to basic types and gives them an epistemological foundation. 
KEYWORDS: adequacy of arguments, argument schemes, branches of argument schemes, epistemological 
theory of argumentation, Kienpointner, practical arguments, probabilistic arguments, types of types of ar-
guments, validity, Walton.  
1. THEORIES OF ARGUMENT SCHEMES AND THE AIMS OF THIS PAPER 
The ancestor of the theories of argument schemes is Aristotle’s incredibly rich and elabo-
rated “Topics”, which dominated rhetoric until the 20th century. However, with the re-
naissance of argumentation theory at the end of the 1950s, the study of argument schemes 
has undergone a continuous inflow of new ideas and approaches. Some important contri-
butions since then have been made by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958), Hastings 
(1963), Grennan (1984, 1997), Schellens (1985, 1987), Govier (<1985> 2000, 1987), 
Kienpointner (1992a, 1992b), Walton (1996), Garssen (1997, 2001, 2002), and Walton & 
Reed & Macagno (2008). Although progress has been made, most of these approaches 
are still strongly influenced by Aristotle’s “Topics”;1 and this might be problematic. Top-
ics, or “topoi” in Greek, are commonplaces; and the main idea of a topical approach to 
argumentation is to establish collections of powerful contents, i.e. ideas from which to 
argue convincingly, which then are classified according to again contentual categories. 
Three interrelated argumentation theoretical problems with this approach are, first, that 
the lists of resulting schemes are long, often very long, never complete and always arbi-
trary. Second, today’s approaches should not be contentual but formal, thereby explaining 
the contents. Third, there is no (more general) theory behind these lists of schemes, which 
could explain and guarantee their validity or some other form of value as well as bring us 
nearer to a really complete list. 
 A quite different approach to argument schemes has been followed in the epis-
temological theory of argumentation, in particular by Feldman (<1993> 1999) and myself 
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  An important exception are e.g. Govier’s system of argument schemes (Govier <1985> 2000) and her 
reflections on classes and the completeness of such classes of argument schemes (1987: 37-54), which 
are comparatively near to the epistemological approach in argumentation theory. 
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(Lumer 1990). The main idea of the epistemological theory is that argumentation should 
lead to knowledge or rationally justified belief; and the theory that explains what rational-
ly justified belief is and provides criteria for this is epistemology in cooperation with oth-
er fundamental philosophical disciplines such as logic, theory of probability and theory of 
practical rationality or prudential desirability. Accordingly, in the two books just men-
tioned, formal criteria for good arguments are developed on the basis of these theories. 
Though the resulting lists of argument types are quite comprehensive and cover many 
more argument schemes than the approaches based on topics, these lists are not complete, 
and they are not systematised in a way that leads to an understanding of the interrelations 
between various groups of argument schemes and to achieving some sort of completeness. 
 The present paper tries to provide this missing kind of (epistemological) theory 
of argument schemes. The function of argumentation and the structure of argument will 
briefly be explained starting from an exposition of the basic idea of the epistemological 
theory of argumentation. This exposition also serves to show how, and on which bases 
good arguments should be constructed, according to the epistemological theory. Among 
these bases are logic, probability theory and the theory of practical rationality and desira-
bility. The theory then goes on to sketch a classification of argument schemes that indi-
cates which kinds of (good) deductive, probabilistic and practical arguments are based—
and in which way—on these underpinnings. The classification strives for a certain kind 
(cf. below) of completeness of the presented argument types. 
 However, before beginning with the constructive part of this endeavour, a short 
critique of some paradigmatical theories of argument schemes shall deepen the apprecia-
tion of the advantages of the epistemological theory of argument schemes. 
2. SOME CURRENT THEORIES OF ARGUMENT SCHEMES— 
AND THEIR SHORTCOMINGS 
To discuss two paradigmatic theories of argument schemes may be sufficient to illustrate 
the necessity for a different approach and its required features. The theories chosen for 
this aim are Kienpointner’s “Alltagslogik” (1992a) and “Argumentation Schemes” by 
Walton, Reed and Macagno (2008). 
2.1 Kienpointner’s “Alltagslogik” 
Kienpointner’s rich collection contains a list of 58 main argument schemes plus 15 sub-
schemes (1992a: 250-402; cf. Kienpointner 1992b: 179-182)—strongly influenced by 
Aristotle’s “Topics” and Perelman’s & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work (1958). These schemes are 
divided into three main classes: I. warrant-using, II. warrant-establishing, and III. other 
schemes, which contain 21 groups of schemes such as “definition”, “genus-species”, 
“whole-part”, “identity / similarity”, “inductive examples”, “cause-effect”, “action-result”, 
“ends-means”, “analogy” or “authority”. As these names clearly reveal, this classification 
of groups is semantic, not formal. One of the genus-species schemes e.g. is scheme (5): 
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(5)  What is predicated on the species [e.g. human] is also predicated on the genus [e.g. living being]. 
X [e.g. to be mortal] is predicated on the species [human].  
Therefore: X [to be mortal] is predicated on the genus [living being]. 
  
(Kienpointner 1992a: 264; insertions in square brackets and translation are mine, C.L.)  
One of the whole-part schemes e.g. is scheme (11): 
(11)  What is predicated on the whole is also predicated on its parts.  
X is predicated on the whole.  
Therefore: X is predicated on the parts.  
 
(Kienpointner 1992a: 274; my translation, C.L.) 
A strong characteristic of Kienpointner’s theory is that he tries to give the schemes a de-
ductively valid form. 47 of the 58 schemes are deductively valid—44 of them have the 
simple modus ponens form (‘if p then q; p; therefore, q’) or the general modus ponens 
form (‘all F are G; a is F; therefore, a is G’)—, another eight schemes are probably in-
tended to be deductively valid, though they are not (a premise is always missing in 
schemes 20, 21, 24 and 25; in schemes 22, 32, 33 and 53 qualifiers like ‘probably’ pre-
vent deductive validity 
2
). Apart from one scheme whose structure is not clear to me 
(scheme 16, Kienpointner 1992a: 276), only two schemes (55 and 56, Kienpointner 
1992a: 385) are neither deductively valid nor (probably) meant to be so.  
 The problem of argument validity is lurking behind this kind of (qua-
si-)deductivism. Kienpointner defends a relativistic conception of validity, according to 
which validity and truth depend on the subjects’ language games (Kienpointner 1992a: 
133-165). The deductivist approach is in strong contrast to this relativism and probably is 
intended to resolve the following major problem. It is a commonplace in argumentation 
theory that many good arguments, even if they are taken as enthymemes and completed 
with additional appropriate premises, are not deductively valid. Therefore, a theory of 
good but not deductive arguments is needed, which is one of the big challenges in argu-
mentation theory. Now, Kienpointner seems to want to resolve this problem by trans-
forming the respective schemes into deductively valid schemes in two ways, strengthen-
ing the premises (in particular in his schemes 5, 11-14, 17, 27, 46-50), or weakening the 
conclusions (e.g. in schemes 51-52). As a consequence, however, the strengthened prem-
ises are plainly or, depending on the respective concretisation, in many or most cases 
false—this already holds for the first premises of the above cited schemes 5 and 11; two 
other examples are: ‘You shall do what everybody / the majority does’ (major premise of 
scheme 17, Kienpointner 1992a: 276) and: ‘If the effect justifies the evaluation X, also 
the cause has to be evaluated as X’ (major premise of scheme 46, Kienpointner 1992a: 
340). And the weakened conclusions in most contexts are useless—e.g. in scheme 51 the 
conclusion, instead of the generalisation ‘all X are Y’, is only: ‘not a few / numerous / 
many / most X are Y’ (Kienpointner 1992a: 368), which mostly is not a very helpful result 
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  In scheme 32 Kienpointner puts ‘probable’ into brackets (Kienpointner 1992a: 311); in scheme 53 he 
writes ‘true / probable’ (Kienpointner 1992a: 374). This loose handling of qualifiers with a too facile 
switch from true to probable, could indicate that Kienpointner might not be completely aware of the 
radical change for the inference’s validity induced by such a switch. 
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if one needs this conclusion as a premise for further reasoning. So Kienpointner’s 
schemes are only an illusory solution to the problem of ampliative, hence non-deductive 
argument schemes, which have the function to provide comparatively strong conclusions 
on the basis of weaker premises. Instead of resolving this riddle, Kienpointner’s proposal 
eliminates ampliative schemes altogether. 
 Three further problems of Kienpointner’s list of argument schemes are these. 
First, the arguments from analogy (schemes 55-56, Kienpointner 1992a: 385) are falla-
cious. The problem is that analogies hold only up to a certain point and that in standard 
argumentative situations we never know whether we are before or beyond that point; in 
addition, there is not even a statistical basis we could use to estimate how far the analogy 
goes; furthermore, often there are problems of interpretation so that we do not even know 
what the continuation of the analogy would be. Therefore, analogies have only heuristic but 
no probative value. Second, even apart from having disregarded (nearly) all ampliative 
argument schemes, Kienpointner’s list is very far from being complete in the deductive 
realm. As already mentioned, most of his schemes have the simple or general modus po-
nens form; Kienpointner’s list contains only very few other deductive or intended to be 
deductive forms (schemes 32, 33, 37, 51 and 52). In logic there are, of course, hundreds of 
deductively valid inference forms, many of them are also used in everyday or scientific rea-
soning. In addition, other weak forms of arguments are missing, in particular practical argu-
ments. Finally, as already the title of Kienpointner’s book indicates, the list is intended to 
cover only forms of everyday reasoning; hence all argument schemes used primarily in scien-
tific contexts are missing. Third, with respect to assessing argument schemes, their strength 
or fallaciousness, the semantic classification of schemes is not theoretically revealing. 
 All this points to a deeper problem. Kienpointner’s “Alltagslogik”, or “everyday 
logic” uses a bottom-up empiristic method. He has analysed large linguistic corpora of 
everyday arguments, arguments in public debate or in advertising, reconstructed these 
arguments and classified them. Though this enormously elaborate work is helpful in some 
respects it does not provide a real theory of argument, which could explain what argu-
ments are, what there function or aim is and how their structure serves to fulfil this func-
tion. There are three major instrumentalist conceptions of arguments and argumentation 
in present argumentation theory, the epistemological, which says that argumentation 
should lead us to justified belief, the rhetorical (in a strict sense), which sees changing an 
addressee’s beliefs as the function of argumentation, and the consensualistic approach, 
which takes consensus or the resolution of differences of opinion to be the function of 
arguments (Lumer 2005b: 189-192). Although Kienpointner’s approach is rhetorical in a 
broad sense, he does not commit himself to any of these or another instrumentalist con-
ception of argumentation. However, only an instrumentalist conception of arguments can 
provide the basis for an elaborate construction and evaluation of argument schemes. 
Therefore, the bottom-up and in a broad sense rhetorical approach cannot provide a deep-
er understanding of arguments nor a deeper evaluation of the validity of argument 
schemes nor a systematic reconstruction of known schemes and the construction of new 
ones, with the final end to develop a complete system of argument schemes. 
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2.2 Walton’s, Reed’s and Macagno’s “Argumentation Schemes” 
Walton & Reed & Macagno (2008) have recently presented what is currently the most 
fruitful system of argument schemes in the rhetorical (in the broad sense) tradition. This 
is a list, called “compendium”, of 60 main argument schemes and a further 44 sub-
schemes, handily described with additional critical questions (Walton et al. 2008: 308-
346).
3
 The schemes again are differentiated according to their content, like “argument 
from position to know”, “argument from expert opinion”, “argument from sunk costs”, 
“argument from sign”, “argument from rules”, or “argument for an exceptional case”. 
However, as compared to Kienpointner’s system, at least prima facie a considerable pro-
gress has been made. Like Walton’s previous endeavour, i.e. “Argumentation Schemes 
for Presumptive Reasoning” (Walton 1996), the collective work (Walton et al. 2008) con-
tains an explicit and new treatment together with an extensive list of presumptive or plau-
sibilist argument schemes. Among the 104 listed schemes only 24 are deductively valid 
and another four are analytically valid, i.e. deductively valid if supplemented by analyti-
cally true premises (my classifications and counts).
4
 Hence the remaining 76 schemes 
should be presumptive argument schemes. The new treatment of presumptive schemes 
consists in adding critical questions to the scheme itself, e.g.:  
1. ARGUMENT FROM POSITION TO KNOW 
Major premise: Source s is in position to know about things in a certain subject domain f 
containing proposition p.  
Minor premise: s asserts that p is true (false).  
Conclusion: p is true (false).  
CRITICAL QUESTIONS 
CQ1: Is s in position to know whether p is true (false)?  
CQ2: Is s an honest (trustworthy, reliable) source?  
CQ3: Did s assert that p is true (false)?  
 
(Walton et al. 2008: 309, Variables changed to my system, C.L.)  
The critical questions, according to Walton et al., express the defeasibility of plausibilist 
arguments. Since plausibilist arguments are not strictly binding like deductive arguments, 
the addressee can ask these critical questions before accepting the conclusion (Walton et al. 
2008: 8). The argument is defeated if the addressee asks an appropriate critical question 
that is not answered by the proponent (ibid.: 3, 9). This treatment of defeasability implies 
that Walton’s, Reed’s and Macagno’s conceptualisation of presumptive arguments is dia-
logical. According to them, advancing an argument shifts the burden of proof, and asking 
the critical question shifts it back again etc. (ibid.: 12, 35-37). In the end holds: “A pre-
sumptive argumentation scheme imposes a relation of conveyance on the respondent such 
that if he accepts the premises, and if the scheme is applicable, and if all the requirements 
of the scheme are met, the conclusion is conveyed to him by these factors.” And this means 
“that he has now been given a cogent reason for accepting it” (ibid.: 36). 
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  The idea to add specific critical questions to every argument scheme goes back to Hastings (1963). 
4
  The deductively valid schemes are: 4, 11.1, 11.2, 12.1, 12.2, 13.2, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18.2, 21.1, 21.2, 26, 
26.1, 32.2, 38, 41, 46, 48, 55.1, 55.2, 55.3, 56; the following schemes are analytically valid: 3, 44, 51, 
54.2 (cf. Walton et al. 2008: 310-344). 
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 To begin with the last point: The quality, validity or acceptability of an argument 
and hence the truth, probability or acceptability of its conclusion can hardly be a question 
of dialogue and burden of proof because we can use these arguments privately, for our-
selves or scrutinise e.g. written arguments of arguers who are unreachable for us (dead, 
staying in distant places etc.) for epistemic purposes, i.e. for examining whether the thesis 
is true. In such cases there is no respondent and no burden of proof. In addition, if I pre-
sent a bad argument to a clever or to a simple addressee where the latter accepts nearly 
everything and the former nearly nothing of my argument this does not change anything 
with regard to the quality of my argument. Therefore, the critical questions should be 
treated as being possibly asked by the arguer himself. Consider the example cited above. 
Questions CQ1 and CQ3 only ask for the truth of the premises, which could be done for 
every premise of every argument. Hence, these critical questions do not add anything new 
regarding presumptive arguments. The only new point is touched upon in question CQ2: 
Is the source honest (trustworthy, reliable)? A too obvious objection regarding this ques-
tion, however, is: why has the answer to this question not been inserted into the argument 
as a further premise in the first place? The authors ask this question themselves (Walton 
et al. 2008: 32 f.), but, they do not give a real answer to it. (They maintain only that the 
insertion is impossible in some cases, which even if it were true, does not say anything 
about the cases where it is possible.) So let us assume that the judgement ‘s is an honest 
(trustworthy, reliable) source’ is added to the above cited scheme as a further premise. 
This does not yet make the scheme deductively valid, it remains a presumptive scheme. 
Now, however, no critical question is left over, the critical question approach of presump-
tive arguments has vanished, leaving behind a presumptive argument scheme without any 
theoretical approach to explain its validity, acceptability or quality. As I said, the scheme 
obtained, i.e. ‘Source s is in position to know about things in a certain subject domain f 
containing proposition p. s is an honest (trustworthy, reliable) source. s asserts that p is 
true. Conclusion: p is true’, is neither deductively nor analytically valid. Even if someone 
is in a position to know about p he need not know whether p, even if he asserts that p: he 
may not have examined at all whether p; the verification may have been false nonethe-
less; he may have forgotten the correct result etc. And even if the source knows the truth 
about p and is generally honest and trustworthy he may have a particular reason in this 
situation to tell lies. The facts stressed in the premises only make it probable that the 
source knows whether p and that he is truthful, thereby making p probable as well. This 
result, however, suggests an adequate reconstruction of the example as a probabilistic 
argument, e.g. as: 
Basic probability (establishing argument):  
P1:  Source s is in position to know about things in the subject domain f of p.  
P2: s is an honest (trustworthy, reliable) source.  
P3: s asserts that p is true.  
P4: If an honest person asserts a proposition x which is in his sphere of competence 
then x is true in the vast majority (about 95%) of cases.  
(P5: The addressee has no better relevant information about s and p than that ex-
pressed in P1-P4.)  
T p is highly probable (has a probability of 0.95).  
ARGUMENT SCHEMES—AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPROACH  
7 
Such a probabilistic reconstruction provides a clear structure for the argument in question 
and a strong epistemological underpinning, namely probability theory. Probability theory 
would constitute the basis of an enormous wealth of probabilistic argument schemes. 
However, Walton’s, Reed’s and Macagno’s compendium does not contain any probabil-
istic argument. 
 With this we are back to the compendium. Notwithstanding the enormous sum-
marising work put into this list, it has several fundamental weaknesses from a theoretical 
point of view. 1. Though the authors affirm the opposite (Walton et al. 2008: 364), the 
compendium is far from complete. Apart from probabilistic arguments most deductive 
arguments are missing as are many others, e.g. a really comprehensive practical justifica-
tion of actions or of instruments, interpretative arguments, complex arguments of any 
form. Furthermore, all argument schemes primarily used in scientific contexts are missing 
as well. 2. On the other hand, the compendium contains many superfluous entries. Most 
of the listed deductive schemes admittedly (ibid. 365) have the modus ponens or the gen-
eral modus ponens form, whereas the defeasible schemes mostly have the form of what 
the authors call a “defeasible modus ponens” (ibid.). If the compendium in general con-
tains so many schemes, why do so many schemes of the same form have to be included 
into the list? Why does it not suffice to include only the form of the arguments so that 
countless specialisations of this form can be constructed by the users of the compendium? 
3. The compendium is not ordered in a very helpful way. Where at a first glance the 
schemes simply seem to be put into a row, a second glance reveals that they are some-
what ordered into thematic groups like arguments about knowledge transfer or practical 
arguments for evaluations—without indicating this explicitly. However, given the implic-
itness of this grouping and the thematic incompleteness as well as the overlap of such 
possible groups the compendium remains rather confusing. (In a somewhat theoretical 
attempt the authors, further below (Walton et al. 2008: 348-351), propose a more formal 
classification of argument schemes. But this classification contains schemes not included 
in the former list and, conversely, does not include all schemes of the compendium; the 
first big group is defined in a way as to include the other groups etc. So this classification 
does not help that much.) 4. I think the majority of the listed schemes does not represent 
good arguments. According to my rough count, 18 out of the 104 schemes are not valid 
but can be repaired 
5
, mostly in the way taken above, in the reconstruction of the scheme 
‘argument from position to know’. However, another 57 (!) schemes are not valid and not 
repairable in such an easy way because too many premises are missing, or because it is 
not obvious which premises are missing, or because the structure fails completely.
6
 In 
addition, four deductively valid schemes contain premises that are plainly false—schemes 
21.1, 21.2, 38, 41 (cf. Walton et al. 2008: 322, 334, 336). The authors may contest these 
verdicts and others may find some of my evaluations debatable; after all what “too many” 
missing premises are is not clear-cut. But the real problem is that the authors have no 
general criterion of argumentative validity or of good arguments by which they could 
                                                 
5
  These are schemes: 1, 2, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 13.1, 22.3, 27, 28, 30, 31.2, 40, 54.1, 54.3, 58, 59.1, 59.2, 60 (cf. 
Walton et al. 2008: 309-346). 
6
  This holds for the schemes: 4.1, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 5, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 7, 8.1, 8.2, 9.1, 
9.2, 10.1, 10.2, 18.1, 19.1, 19.2, 20, 22.1, 22.2, 22.4, 22.5, 22.6, 23, 24, 25, 26.2, 29, 31.1, 31.3, 31.4, 
31.5, 32.1, 33.1, 33.2, 33.3, 33.4, 34, 35, 35.1, 36, 37, 39, 42, 43, 45, 47, 49, 52, 53, 57 (cf. Walton et al. 
2008: 311-344). 
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defend the adoption of a specific scheme for their compendium. Still less do they present 
a justification of such criteria which would tell the reader why he should use the schemes 
or accept conclusions obtained on their basis. 6. Finally, Walton’s, Reed’s and 
Macagno’s approach, like Kienpointner’s, does not contain a real theory of argument 
schemes on the basis of a functional conception of arguments, starting from which good 
arguments can be constructed.
7
 It is a bottom-up collection of (in most cases) empirically 
found schemes. However, without such a theory neither the completeness nor the simplic-
ity of a compendium of schemes can be achieved; furthermore, the quality of the argu-
ments cannot be justified and new good arguments cannot be invented.  
 These negative criticisms conversely imply positive guidelines for the theory of 
argument schemes. Hence the theory to be developed in the following, among others, 
shall be based on a functional idea of arguments; it shall lead to a complete system of 
argument schemes; and it shall provide a justification as to why to adopt the theory and 
the single schemes. 
3. ARGUMENT CHEMISTRY— 
TYPES OF TYPES AND CLASSES OF ARGUMENTS 
In a classification of argument schemes or, more generally, in a theory of argument types 
we very often have to speak of “argument types”. However, a differentiation of argument 
types can be undertaken on quite different levels, where e.g. higher order types subsume 
types of a lower level; or complex types consist of elementary types. In order not to con-
fuse these different levels of differentiation it is useful to distinguish, define and christen 
several types of argument types, including, of course, ‘argument scheme’. 
 Probably the best known field with a comparable mereology in which simple 
and complex units and groups of such units are differentiated is chemistry. Therefore, I 
will often use this analogy for an easier explanation of the classificatory concepts in ar-
gumentation theory and sometimes, for mnemonic reasons, also borrow chemical expres-
sions for types of argument types. 
 On the most basic level we have to distinguish simple and complex, or as I will 
call them, elementary and molecular arguments. Molecular arguments are composed of 
elementary arguments in a (upside down) tree structure such that there is one final or 
highest elementary argument for the final thesis, and the other, lower arguments justify 
intermediate theses, lemmata, that are premises of a higher elementary argument. Ele-
mentary arguments are not composed in this way. If elementary arguments are put to-
gether so that they constitute a molecular argument I say that they are combined to form a 
compound. The general form of an ideal, elementary or molecular argument here will be 
called “argument scheme”. In the analogy chosen here, (valid) argument schemes corre-
                                                 
7
  Walton, Reed and Macagno mention some functions of argumentation—remove doubt, remove disa-
greement, settling an issue (Walton et al. 2008: 268 f.); and their approach is mainly consensualistic 
with rhetorical components. However, the functions just mentioned are far from being clear; and what is 
more, the schemes are not developed on this basis and the authors do not explain how the schemes 
could fulfil these functions. In addition, the authors dismiss a strong relation of good arguments to truth 
and validity (ibid.: 269) and thus reject an epistemological approach to argumentation. There are strong 
reasons in favour of this approach; however, the authors do not provide anything, even only approxi-
mately, as strong as this approach in their own theory. 
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spond to chemical substances. In the following, I will speak mostly of ideal, i.e. com-
pletely explicit and good or valid, argument schemes though usually leaving out the qual-
ification “ideal”; however this shall not imply that all argument schemes are ideal; we can 
also speak of “not ideal argument schemes” or even “fallacious argument schemes”. In 
addition, the schemes described below are always completely explicit; enthymematic 
versions of them could easily be added; however in the present context of classifying the 
main types of arguments this would not be revealing but only swell the exposition. In the 
examples given below pieces of the argument which tend to be left implicit are put in 
angle brackets. To include also molecular schemes in the system of argument schemes 
may seem debatable. However, there are several types of arguments, like interpretative 
arguments, arguments to the best explanation or justifications of actions, adequacy 
proofs, which are common but not well-understood and which argumentation theorists 
consider as argument schemes that a system of argument schemes should capture (cf. e.g. 
Govier 1987: 50, 53). Given the diffusion of these argument types and their complexity 
they should be included in a system of argument schemes that tries to capture and explain 
all relevant types of arguments. Since we cannot, from the start exclude that such argu-
ment types are molecular, the system of schemes should be open to include these types as 
well and hence call their forms “argument schemes”. In fact, as will be shown below, the 
examples just mentioned (interpretative arguments etc.) are all molecular arguments. 
 According to these definitions, ‘All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. There-
fore, Socrates is mortal.’ is an (ideal) elementary argument; the form of this argument, i.e. 
the general modus ponens ‘All F are G. a ist F. Therefore, a is G.’ is an (ideal) elemen-
tary argument scheme. Also all the other deductive inference schemes (if they are not 
circular and can be penetrated by someone in reasonable time) provide ideal elementary 
argument schemes, e.g. double negation: ‘It is not the case that not p. Therefore p.’, con-
tra-position: ‘If not q then not p. Therefore, if p then q.’, or introduction of disjunction: 
‘p. Therefore also, p or q.’ I have found a list with names for 75 schemes from proposi-
tional logic; there may be about another 100 standard inferences from predicate logic, for 
which however the nomenclature is more limited—though, of course, we have the names 
of the syllogisms. These are only the ideal deductive elementary argument schemes; in 
addition there are ideal probabilistic argument schemes—e.g. basic probability establish-
ing: ‘x% of the F are also G. a is F. The data base d does not contain better information 
about a, Fs and Gs. Therefore, the probability that a is G on the data base d is x%.’ 8—
and practical elementary argument schemes (see below), which however, unfortunately, 
mostly have no names. All compounds of elementary argument schemes are molecular 
argument schemes. This holds in particular for deductive argument schemes. Sometimes 
we can present substantially the same inference as a somewhat complex elementary ar-
gument or split it up, for less well trained addressees, into several steps thus obtaining a 
molecular argument—a trivial case is: elementary scheme: ‘If p then q. If q then r. p. 
Therefore, r.’; molecular scheme: ‘If p then q. p. Therefore, q. However also, if q then r. 
Therefore, r.’ According to the numbers of (ideal) elementary argument schemes already 
                                                 
8
  In the respective example of subsection 2.2, the premises P1, P2, P3 correspond to, or better: are concreti-
sations of, the second premise here (in the scheme ‘basic probability establishing’); i.e. the second premise 
here is distributed over three propositions there; hence, for fitting the scheme here, those premises may be 
reformulated and contracted to one premise: ‘P1-P3: The proposition p has been asserted by some honest 
(trustworthy, reliable) source (s) who is in a position to know about things in the subject domain (f) of p.’ 
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mentioned, the number of (ideal) molecular schemes must be huge; we can easily exceed 
10,000, and we only have names for a very few of them.  
 For theoretical reasons we may want to divide the elementary argument schemes 
into groups or classes, as in the periodic system. Unfortunately, no well-known chemical 
term for such groups fits the argumentation theoretical requirements.
9
 A (non-chemical) 
term well-fitting to these requirements is ‘branch’, where such branches may fork into 
branchlets; and the whole system of (ideal) elementary argument schemes would be the 
argument tree. These terms capture the following features of a classificatory system of 
elementary argument schemes. The single elements of the system, i.e. the elementary 
argument schemes (or leaves in the analogy), always are attached to one branch only; and 
every scheme is attached somewhere; the branches may split into branchlets, i.e. sub-
groups; the various branches may have quite varying numbers of leaves, i.e. elementary 
argument schemes. Apart from these features, the terms ‘tree’ and ‘branch’ are neutral as 
regards contents and, therefore, may be used in competing approaches in argumentation 
theory. In the epistemological theory of argumentation presented here, the branches, of 
course, will not be defined e.g. in semantical categories but according to the argument 
schemes’ epistemological underpinnings; in particular there will be a deductive, a proba-
bilistic and a practical branch, which have logic, probability theory and (prudential) de-
sirability theory respectively as their basis.  
 Finally, we may want to group all (ideal) argument schemes, elementary and 
molecular, according to theoretical considerations. One reasonable system of doing this 
divides the set of all schemes on the basis of the branches (or branchlets) in the element 
tree because these branches already represent theoretically important differentiations. The 
groups would then be composed of three subsets: i. all elementary schemes belonging to 
this branch; ii. all molecular schemes which are combined only of elementary schemes 
belonging to this branch (pure molecules); iii. all molecular schemes with elements from 
different branches (impure molecules) but in which one or several elements from this 
branch are dominant because they are the final or highest elements, or because they take 
up the major part of the time or space or because they require the main intellectual effort. 
According to this grouping principle, there may remain a residual class of hybrid argu-
ment schemes (not matching to a branch) with impure molecular schemes that do not ful-
fil condition iii. Objects of common knowledge with such a structure, i.e. which are tri-
partite sets where the subsets are less and less bound to the main set, are comets. Comets 
have: i. a nucleus, ii. a coma, and iii. a tail. Therefore, groups of argument schemes com-
posed in the way just explained here will be called “comets (of argument schemes)”. 
 Having introduced this terminology, we can now specify the aims of the theory 
of argument schemes to be developed in the rest of this paper, in particular the aims re-
garding completeness of the classifications to be provided. 1. Given the numbers cited 
above, in this paper it will not be possible to generate a complete list of all elementary 
argument schemes. In addition, a certain kind of openness of the set—we may perhaps 
always be able to invent some rather complex elementary scheme nobody has thought of 
                                                 
9
  The term ‘period’, i.e. a row of the periodic system, originates from the fact that the chemical properties 
in one row are periodically repeated in the next row—which has no parallel in the system of elementary 
argument schemes. The term ‘main-group’, i.e. a column in the periodic system, is quite generic. Final-
ly, there is not even a generally known overarching term in chemistry for the division into metals, non-
metals, semi-metals, halogens, noble gases etc. 
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so far—could make it actually impossible to present a complete list. Finally, from a theo-
retical point of view, such a complete list would not even be very informative and reveal-
ing because, apart from knowing the most important elementary schemes, it is more im-
portant to understand (and memorise) the formation rules of the elementary argument 
schemes than to have them all present, including the most “absurd” and never used 
schemes. 2. However, it is intended to present a list of all branches of the tree of ideal 
elementary argument schemes, where the branches are tailored in such a way as to take 
up the basic possibilities for realising the function of argumentation. To reach this kind of 
completeness is particularly revealing theoretically because it guarantees that we have 
found the really basic principles of arguments and hence have understood the whole sys-
tem of argumentation. In addition, this kind of completeness is practically informative 
because through it together with the theoretical explanation we will have collected the 
formation principles of all possible argument schemes. So, to present a complete list of 
branches with the explained features implies a theoretically very strong claim. 3. Analo-
gous reasons such as those against a complete list of elementary argument schemes also 
speak against a list of all molecular argument schemes, however in a much stronger way. 
What can and should be presented, though, is a list of comets corresponding to the 
branches of the argument tree and an explanation of the most important not trivial molec-
ular argument schemes. This will also help to reach some empirical confirmation of the 
completeness claim about the branches (cf. 2): every empirically found (ideal) argument 
scheme should be either elementary or it should be explainable as a compound of elemen-
tary schemes from the tree. This empirical confirmation will be flanked by theoretical 
considerations about possible ways to fulfil the function of arguments. 
4. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPROACH TO ARGUMENTATION THEORY 
As stressed above in the critique of alternative approaches to the classification of argu-
ment schemes, such an approach, for providing a real theory, should be based on a gen-
eral argumentation theory, which includes a determination of the function of arguments 
and argumentation. The approach underlying the theory of argument schemes to be pre-
sented in the following is the epistemological theory of argumentation (as it is e.g. sus-
tained by Biro, Feldman, Goldman, Sanford, Siegel, Sinnott-Armstrong and myself; cf. 
Lumer 2005b). According to this theory, the standard output of argumentation is 
knowledge of the argument’s thesis or justified belief in it in the epistemological sense. 
The appertaining standard input is, of course, that an arguer presents the argument to the 
addressee who is not yet convinced of the thesis. However, epistemologists stress that 
arguments can also be used for other functions specific to arguments, in particular for 
individually inquiring about the truth of hypotheses. Putting together standard input and 
standard output we get the standard function of arguments, which, according to the epis-
temological conception, may be called “rational convincing”. Competing full-fledged 
argumentation theories are, first, rhetorical argumentation theories, which aim at persua-
sion, i.e. causing or increasing the addressee’s belief in the argument’s thesis (defenders 
of this view are e.g. Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca, Hamblin), and, second, consensus theo-
ries of argumentation, which see argumentation as a means for reaching (under certain 
restrictions) consensus, i.e. shared beliefs, in an argumentative discourse (different ver-
sions of this approach are e.g. Eemeren’s and Grootendorst’s Pragma-Dialectics and Ha-
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bermas’ discourse theory). This is not the place to defend the epistemological approach or 
to criticise its competitors (see however e.g.: Lumer 1990: 149-158, 287-296, 313 f., 401-
404, 453 f.; Lumer 2005a, 2010). However, one big advantage of the epistemological 
approach is that it aims at true beliefs of the addressee or to come as close as possible to 
truth, which permits the addressee to orientate himself in the world and thus allows him 
to make optimum choices; the other approaches do not have this advantage. 
 The way by which epistemologically conceived argumentation attains the stand-
ard output is the following. The presentation of the argument guides the addressee in rec-
ognising the truth or acceptability of the thesis—so that he is convincing himself of the 
thesis. In order to be able to do this the argument has to be designed on the basis of a 
primary or secondary criterion of truth or, if unattainable, acceptability of the thesis; such 
criteria have been called “epistemological principles”. Primary criteria of truth are the 
respective truth definitions of the thesis, i.e. the definitions or usage rules of the predi-
cates, singular terms and logical operators together with the syntactical rules as they are 
studied in philosophical semantics—in the most trivial case e.g.: ‘a complex proposition 
‘p and q’ is true iff both sub-propositions, ‘p’ and ‘q’, are true’. Secondary truth or ac-
ceptability conditions are based on the primary criteria and make use e.g. of the truth 
functional relations between logically complex propositions or of probabilistic relations 
between propositions. The most trivial general secondary truth condition is the deductive 
epistemological principle: ‘a proposition p is true if (i) p is logically implied by (ii) true 
propositions.’ An epistemologically good argument then consists of the thesis and a se-
quence of judgements listing the specified conditions—or at least the most important of 
them—for the truth or acceptability of the thesis (since the epistemological principles are 
general rules they have to be specified for the thesis in question). The Socrates syllogism 
‘P1: All men are mortal. P2: Socrates is a man. Therefore: T: Socrates is mortal.’, e.g., is 
based on the deductive epistemological principle; it lists two true propositions (cf. ii) that 
logically imply the thesis (cf. i) and by “therefore” it intimates that these propositions 
imply the thesis (cf. i). An argument that specifies the conditions of an epistemological 
principle for the thesis correctly and for which these conditions are fulfilled is argumen-
tatively valid; hence argumentative validity of deductive arguments implies deductive 
validity and soundness, i.e. truth of the premises.
10
 The addressee then can use the argu-
ment for checking whether the conditions of the epistemological principle are fulfilled. If 
he has done so with a positive result he has recognised the truth (or acceptability) of the 
thesis; and because he has done so on the basis of an epistemologically distinguished 
principle he has acquired a rationally justified belief.  
 Argumentatively valid arguments are good instruments. However only a few 
good instruments can be adequately used for realising their standard output in a given 
situation. This applies to arguments as well. For every thesis there are numerous second-
ary ways of recognising their truth or acceptability; each of them can be captured by a 
different argumentatively valid argument. However, most of them are not epistemically 
accessible to the addressee, i.e. the addressee cannot check immediately whether all the 
truth or acceptability conditions listed in this argument are fulfilled; hence, the addressee 
cannot use this argument for recognising the thesis’s truth or acceptability. Therefore, 
                                                 
10
  Because this is only a very rough exposition this explanation of argumentative validity is not complete. 
A precise general definition of this term can be found in Lumer (2005a: 234-236); a specified definition 
of ‘argumentative validity’ for deductive arguments is given in Lumer (1990: 187-189). 
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argumentatively valid arguments that are also epistemically accessible (in a certain situa-
tion, in particular for a given addressee) are adequate for fulfilling the (epistemologically 
conceived) standard function of arguments (in this situation). 
 The most important point of this brief exposition in the present context is that 
epistemologically conceived arguments rely on distinguished epistemological principles 
or, more generally, on truth and acceptability criteria developed in various philosophical 
sub-disciplines. Such sub-disciplines are in particular: logic, probability theory and pru-
dential decision or desirability theory. 
5. ELEMENTARY ARGUMENT SCHEMES— 
THE BRANCHES OF THE ARGUMENT TREE 
According to the ideas explained above, the (main) branches of the tree of elementary 
argument schemes will be tailored in such a way that they take up the basic possibilities 
for realising the function of argumentation. There are two major advantages of dividing 
argument schemes in this way. If the definition of a branch takes up a basic possibility for 
realising the function of argumentation, identifying the related branch then is a guide for 
constructing a functioning or valid argument. And conversely, assigning a branch to a 
given argument will help to evaluate its validity because this classification refers to the 
respective criteria of functioning arguments. 
 According to the just given exposition of the epistemological approach, the func-
tion of argumentation is to rationally convince by allowing the addressee to recognise that 
some truth or acceptability criteria for the thesis are fulfilled. The most general forms of 
such criteria are epistemological principles, which list quite different truth or acceptabil-
ity conditions. Therefore, in the epistemological theory of argumentation, elementary 
argument schemes should be branched according to their underlying epistemological 
principles. This kind of branching has further advantages beyond those already men-
tioned. Because arguments list the specified truth or acceptability conditions of the re-
spective epistemological principle, the argument schemes of different branches are also 
quite different both externally and structurally. Furthermore, the various principles pro-
vide arguments of different strength; hence, classifying arguments and argument schemes 
according to their underlying epistemological principle also implies information about the 
strengths and weaknesses of this type. These are rather strong reasons for classifying epis-
temologically conceived argument schemes according to their underlying epistemological 
principle. These reasons do not exclude that also a different kind of branching may be use-
ful. But the advantages of such a different system would have to be shown in the first place. 
 Now the most basic epistemological principles and epistemological bases used 
in different argument types are the deductive, the probabilistic and the practical epistemo-
logical principle with deductive logic, probability theory and prudential decision and de-
sirability theory as their epistemological underpinnings. Therefore, the main branches of 
the epistemological tree of argument schemes are the deductive, the probabilistic and the 
practical branch. Of course, in any of these branches we have many argument schemes, 
which cannot be listed here. But we can (roughly) describe the different structural condi-
tions generally holding in the various branches. 
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5.1 Deductive argument scheme 
The conditions for ideal deductive arguments are these: 
Deductive argument schemes: 
DA1: Form of the deductive schemes: n judgements r1, …, rn. From these a thesis t is 
inferred: ‘r1, …, rn. Therefore, t.’  
DA2: Argumentative validity: 1. guarantee of truth:  
1. The judgements r1, …, rn are true.  
2. The judgements r1, …, rn logically imply the thesis t.  
DA3: Argumentative validity: 2. Adequacy in principle: There is at least one person 
who at a certain time justifiedly believes that the reasons r1, …, rn are acceptable but 
who does not justifiedly believe this about the thesis.  
DA4: Situational adequacy: A valid deductive argument is adequate for rationally 
convincing an addressee iff the following conditions are fulfilled:  
1. Rationality of the addressee: The addressee is linguistically proficient, open-
minded, attentive, and discriminating.  
2. Convincability: The addressee does not yet know that the thesis is true.  
3. Rational acceptance of the reasons: He justifiedly believes that the reasons r1, …, rn 
are acceptable but does not justifiedly believe this about the thesis. 
4. Intelligibility of the argument: The relation of implication between the propositions 
of the arguments and the proposition of the thesis is sufficiently direct so that it can 
easily be grasped by the addressee.  
Comments: These conditions for deductive arguments—as will be also the following 
conditions—are abridged; complete conditions: Lumer 1990: 187-189. DA1, the descrip-
tion of the form of deductive arguments is empty in the sense that all arguments fall un-
der this description. This holds because of the polymorphism of deductive arguments, 
which does not permit any more specific description. However, condition DA2 discrimi-
nates between deductive and other arguments and argument schemes; also conditions 
DA3 and DA4 have different counterparts in other branches. Adequacy in principle 
(DA3) shall guarantee that deductive arguments are functioning instruments suited for 
realising their standard function, i.e. to rationally convince; in particular, this condition 
excludes that an argument which fulfils conditions DA1 and DA2 begs the question none-
theless. Adequacy in concrete situations (DA4) instead is a sort of instruction for use, 
which tells us in which situations we can use the functioning instrument for its purpose. 
5.2 Probabilistic argument schemes 
There is a great variety of elementary probabilistic argument schemes. In the following 
only a general description of probabilistic argument schemes for singular probabilistic 
judgements following the probability calculus will be provided. Schemes of this type are 
e.g.: ‘The relative frequency of Fs among Gs according to data base d is x. a is G. We 
have no better information about a, Fs and Gs. Therefore, the probability that a is F on 
the data base d is x.’ or: ‘The probability of a on the data base d is x. The probability of 
b on the data base d is y. a and b are mutually exclusive. Therefore, the probability that 
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a or b happens is x+y.’ or: ‘The probability of a&b on the data base d is x. The probabil-
ity of b on the data base d is y. Therefore, the probability of a given b is x/y.’ Argu-
ments for general probabilistic propositions, i.e. arguments for the theorems of the prob-
ability calculus, are deductive, not probabilistic; they do not depend on a given data base. 
Therefore, they will not be discussed here. Many argument schemes from statistics of 
various forms (e.g. establishing confidence intervals or variances, significance calcula-
tions) instead belong to the branch of probabilistic argument schemes but will not be dis-
cussed here for reasons of space and simplicity. In some of them the thesis even has the 
simple form ‘the probability of p on the data base d is x’ but the general theoretical prem-
ises used in them go beyond the axioms and theorems of the simple probability calculus. 
– Since “PA” will be used for abbreviating “practical argument”, the acronym “LA” 
(“Likelihood Argument) will be used for probabilistic argument.  
 The conditions for ideal probabilistic arguments are these: 
Probalistic argument schemes: 
LA1: Form of probabilistic argument schemes: ‘r1, …, rn. Therefore, t.’  
1. Form of the thesis: t, the thesis has the form: ‘The probability of a (given b) on the 
data base d is x.’  
2. Forms of the reasons: 1. At least one of the reasons r1, …, rn is an axiom or theorem 
of the probability calculus, hence a general probabilistic judgement. 2. At least one of 
the reasons is (i) a relative frequency judgement ‘The relative frequency of Fs among 
Gs in the data base d is y.’ or (ii) a singular probability judgement ‘The probability of 
proposition p on the data base d is y.’ or (iii) a conditional probability judgement ‘The 
probability of proposition p given q on the data base d is y.’ or (iv) a probability 
judgement that gives the probability of a mathematically complex term composed of 
probability expressions of the form ‘the probability of p on the data base d’ or ‘the 
probability of p given q on the data base d’ (e.g. ‘(Pd(p&q)/Pd (p) = y’).  
3. Data basis: The relative frequency and singular probability judgements among the 
reasons all refer to the data base d (cf. LA1.1) or in part to d and the other part to a 
predecessor dprior, i.e. d without some evidence e (dprior = d\e).  
LA2: Argumentative validity: 1. guarantee of truth:  
1. True premises: The judgements ri of r1, …, rn are true.  
2. Inferential validity: The axioms and theorems of the probability calculus contained 
in r1, …, rn and the other reasons perhaps contained in r1, …, rn mathematically imply 
t—i.e. according to deductive and arithmetic rules.  
3. Best evidence: d does not contain information that permits stronger conclusions 
about a—i.e. the target proposition of the thesis t (cf. LA1.1)—(or, respectively, about 
the conditional probability Pd(a/b)).  
LA3: Argumentative validity: 2. adequacy in principle: the argument fulfils the stand-
ard function of arguments; i.e. because it is well-ordered and does not contain super-
fluous irritating material it can guide a process of recognising the truth of t without 
having prior knowledge of t.  
LA4: Situational adequacy: A valid probabilistic argument is adequate for rationally 
convincing an addressee of the thesis t and for making him adopt the thesis’s probabil-
ity for himself iff the following conditions LA4.1 to LA4.5 are fulfilled.  
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1. Rationality of the addressee: The addressee is linguistically competent, open-
minded, attentive, discriminating and does not have a sufficiently strong justification 
for the thesis t.  
2. Convincability: The addressee does not yet know that the thesis t is true.  
3. Rational acceptance of the reasons: The addressee has recognised the truth of the 
reasons r1, …, rn or is able to recognise them immediately. 
4. Argumentative knowledge (of the addressee): The addressee knows at least implicit-
ly the idea of the probability calculus and the mathematics used in the argument. And 
5. Data base: The data base dh of the addressee (or hearer) is identical to the data base 
d used in the argument or so near to d that the resulting probabilities regarding the rea-
sons ri and the thesis t remain unaltered.  
An example for such an (ideal) probabilistic argument is: ‘Nearly all / 98% of the people 
of at least two years age who live in Germany speak German. Xaver lives in Germany 
and is more than two years old. This is all we know what could be relevant for deter-
mining Xaver’s linguistic capacities of German. Foundation principle: If the relative fre-
quency of Fs among Gs on a data base d is x; some a is G; and d does not provide better 
information, then the probability that a is F is x. Therefore, Xaver nearly certainly / with 
a probability of 0.98 speaks German.’ 
 Comments: The complete version of these conditions is given in: Lumer 2011a. 
Probabilistic arguments typically, if the resulting probability remains below 1, cannot 
prove the thesis; so they are only substitutes for stronger arguments (or other means of 
cognising) which could prove the thesis but which are unavailable or too costly. There-
fore, the imperfect knowledge obtained by probabilistic arguments is defeasible and open 
to be substituted by the results of stronger methods of cognising. This makes up the non-
monotonicity of probabilistic arguments: further information can require a revision of the 
probabilistically justified thesis. This leads to at least two forms of data dependencies of 
probabilistic arguing. (i) A thesis’s probability has to be determined on the basis of the 
strongest information already acquired (cf. LA2.3). (ii) In addition, of course, one might 
convince an addressee that the probability of a thesis t on a certain data base d is x. How-
ever, this would only be a kind of hypothetical belief if d were not the addressee’s data 
base; he would believe: if my data base were d I now would believe that the probability 
of a is x. So, if the addressee shall adopt the probability x argued for as his own, the data 
base of the argument must (in its relevant parts) coincide with his own data base (cf. 
LA4.5). This data base dependency goes beyond the requirement of rational acceptance of 
the reasons (LA4.3)—which has a counterpart in the conditions for deductive arguments: 
DA4.3—as can be seen considering the following case: if the addressee had rationally ac-
cepted the reasons but had e.g. additional information about a (in the extreme case he could 
even know that a) then he should not adopt the probability calculated in the argument on 
the data basis d as his own. There is no parallel to this in deductive argumentation. 
5.3 Practical argument schemes 
Practical argument schemes have their name because in the last instance they shall guide 
our practice, i.e. our actions. Elementary practical arguments schemes systemise argu-
ments for personal prudential value judgements, i.e. theses of the form: ‘p is good / bad 
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for the subject s to the degree x.’, where p is a state of affairs. An argument of this type is 
not yet immediately practical because the thesis does not yet imply whether the subject s 
should do something about the value object p and if yes what. But such elementary argu-
ment schemes can be used as premises for directly practical, i.e. action justifying argu-
ments, which however are already molecular: ‘That the subject s does action A1 (at time t) 
is the best option for s (among the options considered)’. The molecular argument for jus-
tifying this optimality judgement consists of various elementary arguments for valuations 
of the single options considered and a final deductive argument for the thesis that doing 
A1 has the highest value (cf. below). 
 The conditions for ideal practical arguments are these: 
Practical argument schemes: 
PA1: Form of the (differentiating) practical argument scheme: 
1. Form of the thesis: The thesis t has (in the most ideal case) the form: ‘On the data 
base d the (prospect) desirability of event e for subject s (and a relevance threshold r) 
is u.’ The prospect desirability is a consequentialist form of desirability where the 
consequences of the value object are not known with certainty but only probabilistical-
ly, such that the value of these possible consequences has to be adjusted according to 
their probability. (A special form of prospect desirability is expected desirability 
which weights probabilistic consequences linearly, i.e. by their probability.) Total de-
sirability is a limiting case of prospect desirability where all consequences have the 
probability 1. 
2. Forms of the reasons: 1. There are n judgements of the form: ‘On the data base d 
the probability that e implies (in particular: causes) the consequence ci is pi.’, with 
0<pi≤1. 2. For all judgements of the first form there is an associated judgement of the 
form: ‘On the data base d the prospect or total desirability of the consequence ci for the 
subject s is ui.’ Prospect desirabilities have to be provided if the consequences have 
relevant but not certain consequences themselves. The total desirability instead can be 
given if the consequence has no relevant consequences or if these consequences are 
known with certainty. 3. There is one judgement of the form: ‘On the data base d, the 
consequences c1, …, cn are all the r-relevant consequences of e.’ This means for all 
these consequences ci (the absolute value of) the product of their probability pi and 
their prospect or total desirability ui (for s) is equal to or greater than the relevance 
threshold r (|pi∙ui| ≥ r); and there are no further consequences of e exceeding the rele-
vance threshold r. 4. Finally, there is one judgement stating: ‘The sum of all the prod-
ucts of the relevant consequences’ ci desirability ui and their respective probability pi 
is equal to u (∑i ui∙pi = u).’ This is only the standard version of reason type 4, which 
uses expected utility as the measure of e’s prospect desirability, i.e. the desirability of 
a consequence is weighted according to its probability (linear probability weighting). 
Sometimes more complex forms are proposed, which use non-linear weights of proba-
bilities or utilities. Such complications may be ignored here. 
3. Data base: All reasons mentioning a data base refer to the same data base d. 
PA2: Argumentative validity: 1. guarantee of acceptability: 1. All reasons ri of the ar-
gument are true. 2. The consequences of e listed in the first series of reasons (PA1.2.1) 
are disjunct, i.e. one and the same consequence is listed only once, and no one of the 
listed consequences is (partially) entailed in another consequence.  
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PA3: Argumentative validity: 2. Adequacy in principle: There is a person sx for whom 
d is the set of relevant data which can influence the evaluation of e.  
PA4: Situational adequacy: A valid (differentiating) practical argument with the char-
acteristics just explained is adequate for rationally convincing an addressee h (hearer) 
that e is desirable for s to the degree u iff the conditions PA4.1 to PA4.5 hold:  
1. Rationality of the addressee: The addressee is linguistically competent, open-
minded, attentive, discriminating.  
2. Convincability: The addressee does not have a (valid) justification for the thesis t or 
for a contradicting thesis, which attributes e a different desirability than u, or only a 
justification that is weaker than the one presented in the argument.  
3. Data base: dh, i.e. the addressee’s data base, in its parts relevant for the argument is 
identical to data base d underlying the argument or it is a subset of d. In the latter case and 
if the addressee’s data base dh contains data incompatible with the argument’s data base d, 
before an adequate use of the argument, the arguer and the addressee first have to ex-
change information and perhaps also other arguments to equalise the data bases d and dh.  
4. Knowledge about the consequences: The addressee already justifiedly believes in 
the consequence listing reasons (reasons of type PA1.2.1) or he is able to recognise 
their acceptability immediately. (There are no respective conditions regarding the 
evaluating reasons (PA1.2.2) and the calculation (PA1.2.4) because the truth of these 
reasons can be recognised immediately, in actu. And there is no prior knowledge re-
quirement with respect to the completeness statement because its truth, given the huge 
data bases we usually dispose of, cannot be positively recognised at all.)  
5. Relevance level: The relevance level r chosen in the argument is not more coarsely-
grained than the level rationally desired by the addressee.  
6. Practical function: For having a practical function, i.e. for making the addressee not 
only rationally believe in the thesis t but making him also adopt the valuation ex-
pressed in it as his own, the value subject s (referred to in the thesis t) has to be identi-
cal to the addressee h or has to have—in the relevant respects—the same value func-
tion as the addressee h. 
An example for such an (ideal) practical argument is: ‘To cycle to the office is a good 
physical exercise for me, it is eco-friendly, nearly as fast as to go by car, and the proba-
bility of being caught in a rain today is marginal / 1%. According to my present infor-
mation, these are all the relevant consequences of cycling to the office. These consequenc-
es, according to my preferences, are very good, good, satisfactory and marginally bad re-
spectively which can be rated as 4 + 2 + 1 + (-2 · 0.01), which sums up to a very, very 
high utility to a utility of 6.98. Therefore, cycling to the office according to my present 
information is very, very good for me has a rating of 6.98.’ Because the first three conse-
quences, unlike the fourth, are certain there is no need to weight them by their probability. 
 Comments: The complete conditions are given in: Lumer (1990: 362-366). That 
in the evaluative reasons (cf. PA1.2.2) the consequences are again appraised in terms of 
prospect or total desirability seems to lead to a vicious circle because the argument’s the-
sis is already of this type of evaluation. However, in the end consequences should be ap-
praised in terms of their own intrinsic desirability and the intrinsic desirability of their 
consequences, hence in terms of a desirability that is attributed to the value object inde-
pendently of its consequences. So, tracking the consequences of consequences up to in-
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trinsically relevant consequences leads to leaving the seeming circle with the help of a 
different kind of evaluation. Practical arguments that track the way of consequences up to 
this end may be called “grounding practical arguments”. Since the ways to possible in-
trinsic consequences are usually so ramified and pass so many intermediate consequenc-
es, real grounding practical arguments are very rare; instead, in our practical arguments we 
follow these ramifications only up to a certain point and estimate the prospect desirability 
of the remaining branchelets. Which objects have intrinsic value and how much is the topic 
of a long lasting philosophical discussion, which cannot be dealt with here. However, the 
hypothesis that has the most supporters is rational hedonism, according to which only one’s 
own pleasures and pains have intrinsic desirability for oneself. Such a hypothesis provides 
the basis for quantifying the desirabilities in the evaluating reasons (PA1.2.2). 
5.4 The irreducibility of the three branches 
Are these three argument schemes really basic, or is it possible to reduce one or even two 
of them to another scheme?  
(1) Deductive arguments, in principle, could be conceived as special probabilistic 
arguments: the premises would have to be transformed into the form: ‘The prob-
ability of ri on the data base d is 1’; and the deductive inference relation would 
have to be expressed as a conditional probability of 1: ‘The probability of t given 
r1 and … and rn on the data base d is 1.’ However, it would be misleading and 
unwise to conceptualise deductive arguments in this way. First, the “conditional 
probability” is not established on a frequentist basis but logically. Second, by 
such a reduction one would introduce data base dependency and non-
monotonicity where there is no need to do so.  
(2) Also, practical arguments cannot be reduced to probabilistic arguments for simi-
lar reasons. The valuations and the calculation are not probabilistic at all. The 
basis for the final step in practical arguments from all the premises to the con-
clusion is the definition of ‘desirability’ and not the probability calculus.  
(3,4) Deductive and probabilistic arguments cannot be reduced to practical arguments 
because the latter have such a special thesis and form that the reduction would 
not work in most cases yet for this reason. – The really interesting cases of a 
possible reduction are the remaining two.  
(5) Because of the particular form given here to probabilistic arguments, namely to 
include the respective axiom or theorem of the probability calculus among the 
premises and to make the reference to the data base explicit, their premises ana-
lytically imply the thesis. However, other features make the reduction of proba-
bilistic to deductive arguments impossible. The pragmatic requirement LA4.5, 
that the argument’s data base has to be identical to the addressee’s data base, and 
the best evidence requirement LA2.3 (that the data base does not contain infor-
mation which permits stronger conclusions about the thesis) have no counter-
parts in deductive argument schemes. This is necessarily so because probabilistic 
arguments are only substitutes for stronger arguments so that a rational subject 
will abandon the weaker justification and rely on a stronger one as soon as it is 
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available—this is the non-monotonicity of probabilistic arguments—; for deduc-
tive arguments there is no need to switch to a stronger justification.  
(6) Finally, practical arguments cannot be reduced to deductive arguments either. 
Prima facie, practical arguments may be conceived as definitoric arguments: 
they try to show that the conditions of the definition of ‘prospect desirability’ are 
fulfilled for the evaluation in question; hence, adding this definition the argu-
ment should be deductively valid. However, three features of practical argument 
schemes prevent such a reduction. First, the definition of ‘prospect desirability’ 
requires the inclusion of all the possible consequences with a desirability une-
qual to zero in the evaluation. But usually there are so many consequences 
which fulfil this condition that it is impossible and pragmatically useless to list 
them all. This implies that the deductive premise set is incomplete. The introduc-
tion of a relevance threshold is only a workaround for this problem. Second, that 
all non-neutral or relevant consequences are included among the consequences 
listed is necessary for the practical arguments’ validity (cf. PA1.2.3 and PA2.1), 
but because of our huge data bases this completeness cannot be proved positive-
ly. Therefore, the respective adequacy condition of practical arguments, unlike 
that for deductive arguments, does not require the respective justified belief about 
the premise (cf. PA4.3 and DA4.3). Third, because of their probabilistic compo-
nents, practical arguments too, unlike deductive arguments, depend on a data base. 
In addition, for practical arguments fulfilling their specific practical function, the 
value subject spoken of in their theses has to be the addressee (or someone with 
the same value function). 
These results show that deductive, probabilistic and practical argument schemes make up 
three different branches in the tree of elementary argument schemes. Their epistemologi-
cal underpinnings are: deductive logic, probability theory and (prudential) desirability 
theory. These epistemological underpinnings are so different from each other that these 
three branches also have to be distinguished from the epistemological point of view. 
6. ADDING MOLECULAR ARGUMENT SCHEMES— 
THE COMET SYSTEM OF ARGUMENT SCHEMES 
According to the principles of the classification system explained above (sect. 3), the 
branches of the tree of elementary argument schemes make up the nuclei of the comets of 
elementary and molecular argument schemes. Therefore, we will have a deductive, a 
probabilistic and a practical comet. The following comet system contains only the most 
important schemes and groups of schemes and is far from being complete. As explained 
above (sect. 3), argument scheme comets consist of three main subgroups: the nucleus, 
i.e. elementary schemes of the respective branch, the coma, i.e. pure molecular schemes 
of the respective branch, and the tail, i.e. impure molecules with dominant elements from 
the respective branch. However, the following classification system does not divide ele-
mentary and molecular pure argument schemes (nucleus and coma) into two different 
groups because, as a consequence of the fact that we can omit lemmata thus condensing a 
molecular argument to a complex elementary argument (cf. above, sect. 3), there is a 
smooth transition between them so that many names would have to be listed twice. Some-
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times it is also difficult to decide whether a given molecular scheme is still pure or al-
ready impure (hence whether it is part of the coma or of the tail). This is due to the fact 
that nearly all reasons of an argument may be justified by further elementary arguments, 
which then may belong to another branch. With respect to this problem, the following 
classification tries to consider only what is most essential and typical for a certain argument 
scheme, i.e. to cut the non-essential parts, for making the classification more significant. 
 The comet system of argument schemes:  
1. Deductive argument schemes: 
1.1. Pure deductive argument schemes: 
1. Elementary deductive argument schemes which correspond to the inference 
schemes of deductive (propositional and predicate) logic. – The following subgroups 
of pure deductive argument schemes are mainly distinguished content-wise, according 
to particular premises used. Apart from that they may have quite different forms. The 
three subgroups listed, analytical, definitoric and subsuming legal arguments, can be 
elementary or molecular; therefore, they are neither a subgroup of elementary deduc-
tive schemes nor parallel to them. This kind of complication is the price of inserting 
groups defined by contents—which is done here for illustrative reasons. The same 
complication holds for the other schemes defined content-wise of the following main 
groups (in particular indicatory arguments and genesis of knowledge arguments). 
2. Analytical arguments, which may be elementary or not, are arguments with (exclu-
sively or predominantly) analytically true premises. 
2.1. Mathematical proofs (including proofs in probability theory and pure mathe-
matical statistics) use mathematical axioms as their most important premises. 
3. Definitoric arguments are arguments which have a definition as their major premise 
and which in their further premises claim that the definitoric conditions are fulfilled 
for a certain object. If the object fulfils all the definitoric conditions the defined con-
cept applies to it. There are some exceptions of definitoric arguments where the defini-
tion is so strong that its condition cannot be proved to be fulfilled; the definition of 
‘prospect desirability’ is a case in kind. In such a case the definitoric argument is also 
necessarily incomplete and hence not deductively valid. 
3.1. Descriptive statistical arguments: Descriptive statistics is that branch of ap-
plied statistics that deals with the analysis of data about a sample, e.g. what the 
mean value and the variance of a certain kind of value in the sample is or what the 
correlation between several types of values in the sample is. The respective argu-
ments use the definitions of these statistical terms as premises. And because they 
apply them to a rather limited set (the sample) for whose elements complete data 
are used, these arguments are deductively valid.  
4. Subsuming legal arguments have a legal norm as their major premise, whereas the 
minor premises describe a certain case and claim that the conditions of this norm (do 
not) apply to this case.  
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1.2. Impure deductive argument schemes: 
1. Adequacy proofs have a list of adequacy conditions as their major premise (‘an ade-
quate F has to fulfil conditions a, b, c.’); the minor premises of the final elementary 
argument state that these conditions are (not) fulfilled for a certain object, which in the 
final thesis is judged to be (not) adequate. So far adequacy proofs are purely deduc-
tive. However, to prove that the single conditions are fulfilled is a further essential part 
of adequacy proofs. These elements often will not be deductive. 
2. Probabilistic argument schemes: 
2.1. Pure probabilistic argument schemes: 
1. Elementary probabilistic argument schemes use the axioms and theorems of the 
probability calculus as their major reasons and apply them to particular cases, thereby 
sustaining a singular probabilistic thesis which depends on a certain data base (cf. 
above, sect. 5). —The following subgroups of pure probabilistic argument schemes are 
mainly distinguished content-wise, according to particular premises used. 
2. Generalising arguments / enumeratively inductive arguments are arguments which 
infer from the fact that a certain attribute is present in every element of a sample that 
this attribute will be present in every element of the population. Though this enumera-
tive induction in everyday life is undertaken in a primitive form without further quali-
fication or with an unclear reservation, e.g. that the general thesis “probably” holds, 
for being epistemologically valid these arguments have to be regimented by statistics. 
Statistics, however, in an improved version of these arguments, attributes a probability 
value to the thesis, and this value depends mainly on the (random) sample selection 
and the sample size.
11
  
3. Projective statistical arguments are regimented by projective statistics, which is that 
part of statistics that deals with the question if and with which probability the features 
found in a sample can be projected on the population. A classical question is the de-
termination of confidence intervals for a predefined significance level. The signifi-
cance level is a desired degree of probability that the projection is correct, e.g. 0.95 or 
0.99; the confidence interval then is an interval for a sought value for which, on the 
basis of our findings about the sample we can say that the real value with a probability 
of 0.95 or 0.99 is within this interval. 
4. Indicatory arguments / arguments from sign infer from evidence about an indicator 
or sign to the state of affairs indicated, e.g. ‘Peter’s bicycle stands before Tom’s house. 
Therefore, Peter is in Tom’s house.’ Sometimes they are reconstructed as abductive 
arguments, i.e. as an inversion of a modus ponens argument: ‘if a then b. b. Therefore, 
                                                 
11
  A strong argument against a probabilistic conceptualisation of enumerative induction was that the prob-
ability of universal laws then must have a probability of zero or close to zero because in the case of uni-
versal laws the sample is vanishingly small compared to the population. In particular usual requirements 
of a random selection of the sample cannot be fulfilled because we have access only to a very limited 
section of the universe. At first sight surprisingly, however, statistical significance calculations do not 
take into account the size of the universe but only the sample size. This approach may be justified if we 
can assume a background hypothesis that the universe is homogenous. This background assumption, 
however, cannot be justified statistically; it has to be justified quite differently. Pascal arguments offer 
one possibility for doing so (cf. below and Lumer 1997). 
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a.’ However, this argument scheme, of course, is not deductively valid and empirically 
so often false that it is considered to be a fallacy, which has even its own name: “af-
firming the consequence”. On the other hand, indicatory arguments often seem to 
function quite well, like the bicycle example. Therefore, a different reconstruction is 
required, which can also capture the difference between valid and invalid indicatory 
arguments. One such reconstruction is a simple probabilistic argument, a basic proba-
bility establishing argument (cf. above, sect. 2): ‘b has the quality B. In most cases 
relative frequency z where an x is B this x is also A. The addressee has no better in-
formation about b and Bs and As. Therefore, most probably with a probability of z b 
is also A.’ or: ‘a stands in relation B to b. In most cases relative frequency z where an 
x stands in relation B to a y, x stands also in relation A to y. The addressee has no bet-
ter information about a, b, As and Bs. Therefore, most probably with a probability of 
z a stands in relation B to b.’ In our example the relation B may be: ‘person x’s bicy-
cle stands before building y and x is not in sight outside of y’ and A may be: ‘person 
x is in building y’. Such a probabilistic reconstruction gives the scheme a clear and jus-
tifying epistemological basis. 
5. Genesis of knowledge arguments are arguments which infer from an arguer’s claim 
about a state of affairs and a story about (i) how the claim has been verified by some-
one and (ii) how this knowledge has been transmitted to the arguer to the (high) prob-
ability of the claim. The two stories can be more or less extended; genesis of 
knowledge arguments which provide more details tend to be stronger. In minimalist 
versions of genesis of knowledge arguments one of the two stories is omitted entirely 
and the other is reduced to one sentence; such arguments are very weak. Genesis of 
knowledge arguments can be basic probability establishing arguments (cf. the recon-
struction above, in subsect. 2.2). Very often, however, they are molecular, combining 
several elementary probability establishing arguments which lead step by step from 
the claimed state of affairs to the arguer’s claim. There are several traditional sub-
forms of genesis of knowledge arguments, which differ with respect to the kind of 
source they are relying on. (More details: Lumer 1990: 246-260.) 
5.1. Arguments from personal verification describe how the arguer himself has veri-
fied the thesis by observation.  
5.2. Arguments from witness testimony rely on an observation (in principle open to 
any rational subject) by a witness.  
5.3. Arguments from historical sources rely on historical documents.  
5.4. Arguments from authority / from expert opinion rely on an expert’s opinion 
about a matter for experts. 
2.2. Impure probabilistic argument schemes: 
1. Interpretative arguments / arguments to the best explanation are more complex than 
the pure probabilistic arguments considered so far. With the help of several alternative 
sets of hypotheses they try to explain some known facts about whose origins we have 
not sufficient information; then they determine the probabilities of these sets of hy-
potheses; finally, they may establish the probability of a particular hypothesis from 
these sets one is specially interested in. In a whodunit this special thesis e.g. may be 
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that person s has committed the murder. So these arguments consist of several sub-
types: (i) arguments which establish that a certain set of hypotheses really explains the 
known facts; these arguments can be deductive or statistical; (ii) arguments which try 
to determine the prior probability of such a set of hypotheses; (iii) arguments in which 
the posterior probability of the sets of hypotheses is calculated with the help of Bayes’ 
law, based on the fact that the known facts can be explained only with these sets of 
hypotheses; (iv) one argument that sums up the posterior probabilities of those sets of 
hypotheses which contain the particular hypothesis in question. (More details about in-
terpretative arguments: Lumer 1990: 224-246.) 
3. Practical argument schemes for value judgements: 
3.1. Pure practical arguments for pure evaluations: 
The scheme for differentiating practical arguments described above (sect. 5) captures 
mainly valuations under risk, i.e. situations in which we can only assign probabilities 
to the possible consequences of the value object. To this argument scheme we have to 
add further argument schemes for other informational situations. 
1. Practical arguments for (pure) evaluations under certainty.  
2. Practical arguments for (pure) evaluations under risk.  
3. Practical arguments for (pure) evaluations under simple uncertainty are designed 
for situations in which we cannot assign numerical probabilities to (some or all) possi-
ble consequences of the value object.  
4. Practical arguments for (pure) evaluations under radical uncertainty are designed 
for situations in which we even have difficulties in establishing the kind of possible 
consequences of the value object.  
3.2. Impure practical argument schemes: 
1. Practical arguments for / justifications of actions are arguments for an optimality 
judgement that a certain course of action is the best among the available options. In the-
se molecular arguments first the various options have to be assessed in pure practical ar-
guments; subsequently the best option has to be determined in an analytical argument.  
2. Arguments in favour of / justifications of instruments are arguments for an optimali-
ty judgement that a certain instrument is the best among the available tools or at least a 
very good instrument. What has to be valued here is the typical use (depending on the 
kind of instrument, this may be a use over a long time) of such an instrument; in addi-
tion, particular weight is given to the functional requirements of such an instrument; if 
a given instrument does not fulfil the standard function of this type of instrument to a 
certain degree the instrument is discarded altogether—independently of how well it 
fares in other respects.  
2.1. Practical arguments for definitions justify a definition by showing that, apart 
from fulfilling the formal requirements of definitions, it is a good or the best in-
strument in the respective context; i.e., with the help of this definition, e.g. certain 
axioms or theorems of a theory can be formulated quite easily. (More details: Lu-
mer 1990: 209-221.)  
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2.2. Practical arguments for empirical theories (in particular also physical theo-
ries) try to show that a given empirical theory is the best among the proposed theo-
ries. The main task of these arguments is not to show that the theory under scrutiny 
is essentially true in the sense of not making false predictions; this is only one as-
pect and more or less presupposed. The main task is instead to show that the theory 
fulfils the functional requirements of good empirical theories well: (1) the theory is 
simple, contains only few relatively simple axioms; (2) it is (relatively) fundamen-
tal in the sense of capturing the most basic empirical laws, the smallest causal steps; 
(3) it is complete, i.e. it can explain all phenomena of its empirical field; (4) there 
are no anomalies which the theory cannot explain; etc.  
2.3. Practical arguments for technically-constructive theories in philosophy are used in 
some philosophical theories which take the construction of useful instruments to be one 
central task of several philosophical sub-disciplines, e.g. in ethics the construction of 
moral criteria, in logics the construction of logical operators and inference systems, in 
epistemology primary and secondary criteria for knowledge and justification, in argu-
mentation theory systems of argument schemes. On a very abstract level the respective 
philosophical arguments in favour of certain normative criteria then are again justifica-
tions of instruments as just explained. (More details: Lumer 2011b.)  
3. Arguments for evaluations based on adequacy conditions are less elaborate than the 
practical arguments described above (sect. 5) in the sense that they do not really quan-
tify. Their bases are adequacy conditions which represent certain advantages or neces-
sary conditions a certain type of instrument should have. However, the argument goes 
beyond stating that the adequacy conditions are fulfilled; it proceeds to an evaluation, 
taking e.g. particularly into account to what degree the adequacy conditions are ful-
filled. Because of their somewhat primitive form, which does not make use of a pre-
cise formal structure, they are also especially suitable for justifying more formal 
schemes of practical argument and of reasoning in a non-circular way.  
4. Arguments for welfare-ethical value judgements presuppose a welfare-ethical criterion 
for ‘moral desirability’ which aggregates the individual desirabilities of a given object for 
the interested persons to a comprehensive moral desirability—e.g. the utilitarian definition 
of ‘moral desirability’ as the sum (or the mean) of all individual desirabilities, or a more 
complex, e.g. prioritarian or moderate egalitarian, definition of ‘moral desirability’. The 
molecular argument then consists of a series of elementary practical arguments that estab-
lish the various individual desirabilities of the object in question, and an elementary 
definitoric argument that aggregates the obtained individual desirabilities with the help of 
the definition of ‘moral desirability’ to the final moral value judgement.  
5. Pascal arguments / practical arguments for theoretical theses are practical argu-
ments which justify that in a given epistemic and practical situation it is best to act as 
if a certain thesis were true. Although these arguments cannot substantiate the thesis 
itself on theoretical grounds—the adequacy conditions of Pascal arguments require 
that no such theoretical grounds are available—they aim at an epistemic acceptance of 
the thesis on practical grounds, e.g. that otherwise no action would be possible or that 
a realist interpretation of phenomena would facilitate our reasoning. Because of their 
minimalist epistemic presuppositions Pascal arguments are particularly suitable for 
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deciding on some very fundamental philosophical questions—like the existence of the 
outside world or the homogeneity of the universe. (More details: Lumer 1997.)  
4. Hybrid argument schemes: 
So far I have not found valid standard schemes of molecular arguments which are so het-
erogeneous that they cannot be assigned to the three comets (which have the branches as 
their nucleus). Hence the class of hybrid schemes remains empty for the time being. 
7. COMPLETENESS OF THE BRANCHES OF THE ARGUMENT TREE 
In sections 4 and 5 some hints about the instrumental adequacy of the arguments set out in 
the branches have been given. In section 5 the irreducibility of the branches has been proved. 
What has still to be shown is the completeness of the comet system.
12
 As explained above, 
the list of argument schemes in the comet system of section 6 is not complete. The comet 
system is complete at most in the sense that all valid argument schemes can be integrated into 
it insofar as these schemes are elementary and pertain to the branches set out in section 5 or 
are molecular and can be decomposed into elementary argument schemes which again per-
tain to the branches. So what has to be shown here is the completeness of the branches ex-
plained in section 5 (and taken over in section 6). There are at least three main ways to 
show—positively or negatively—the completeness of the system of argument schemes.  
7.1 Empirical search 
One can check whether i. empirically found arguments and ii. argument types proposed 
by theoreticians represent schemes covered by the comet system. If an argument scheme 
has been found that is not (and shall not be) covered by the system it has to be shown that 
this scheme is not valid or is defective in another way. I have checked many arguments 
found in the literature and all the schemes proposed in the argumentation theoretical liter-
ature consulted (in particular, of course, the lists of Kienpointner and Walton et al.) and 
have not detected any good scheme that would not be covered by the proposed system. 
(Because the vast majority of e.g. Kienpointner’s schemes is elementary and deductively 
valid it is already covered by group 1.1.1 of the above classification. The same holds for 
the deductively valid schemes of Walton, Reed and Macagno (cf. above, note 4), whereas 
their many “defeasible modus ponens” schemes that are reconstructable as basic probabil-
ity establishing or similar schemes as well as some others 
13
 are covered by groups 2.1.1, 
2.1.4 or 2.1.5 of the above classification; with several major modifications their scheme 
22.3 (Walton & Reed & Macagno 2008: 323) can be reconstructed as the action justifica-
tion scheme (scheme 3.2.1 of the above classification).)  
 However, I would like to mention some proposals made in the argumentation 
theoretical literature which I have discarded. Arguments from analogy (proposed e.g. by 
Govier 1987: 50; <1985> 2000; Walton et al. 2008: 315-316; Kienpointner 1992a: 384-
                                                 
12
  See also Garssen’s list of formal adequacy conditions for theories of argument schemes (Garssen 2002: 233). 
13
  More precisely, the following schemes of Walton, Reed and Macagno can be reconstructed as probabilistic 
schemes: 1, 2, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 13.1, 27, 28, 30, 31.2, 40, 54.3, 59.1, 59.2, 60 (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 
309-346). 
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393) have already been criticised (above, subsect. 2.1) as fallacious; the same holds for 
Walton’s, Reed’s and Macagno’s schemes for presumptive reasoning. Govier, following 
Wellman, has proposed “conductive” argument schemes, which list several arguments 
independent of each other but all relevant and necessary for the conclusion (Govier 1987: 
50; 1999: 155-180). These explanations are very vague and may cover quite different 
argument schemes. Simple practical arguments (cf. above, sect. 5, schemes 3.1) have 
these features; but they are explained here in a much more precise and theoretically re-
vealing way. Other arguments subsumed by Govier as being conductive may be recon-
structed as interpretative arguments (my scheme 2.2.1), still others are convergent deduc-
tive arguments (e.g. arguments for a negated general proposition where several instances 
that falsify the general proposition are invoked). So, conductive arguments do not really 
make up a kind. One of the theoretically most ambitious challenges to the above system 
of branches presumably is Rescher’s plausible reasoning (Rescher 1976), which could 
constitute a fourth branch of the tree. However, I have found Rescher’s proposal lacking 
in several respect and, therefore, not included. (The plausibility values are arbitrary or at 
best intuitive. The whole system of plausible reasoning is much weaker than probabilistic 
reasoning, without offering any advantage in exchange. It is not integrated into a complete 
system of reasoning that also includes probabilistic reasoning. The possibility of admitting 
contradictory propositions each with high plausibility values shows that the system covers 
at most initial plausibilities but not a (temporary) final state of one’s consideration.) A fur-
ther candidate that might establish a fourth branch of elementary argument schemes are 
argument schemes on the basis of non-monotonic logic (overview: Antonelli <2001> 
2010). Apart from their (often) enormous complexity, some major problem of these logics 
are that they do not provide an epistemological underpinning and justification of their sys-
tems: why is it epistemically rational to believe in the conclusions of the respective infer-
ence rules? Another problem is that these systems do not differentiate degrees of justifica-
tion. As a consequence they have difficulties to handle justified but contradicting beliefs. 
 For illuminating criteria for epistemologically good and rational ways of reason-
ing and arguing, another candidate that might constitute a further branch of the tree of 
elementary argument schemes shall be dicussed in more detail: Rescher’s concept of pre-
sumptive reasoning (Rescher 2006). Rescher’s presumptive reasoning is inspired by de-
fault-logic, as it has been suggested in Artifical Intelligence (e.g. by Reiter 1980 or Bach 
1984). It is a form of defeasible, hence non-monotonic reasoning, which in the absence of 
better information and of refuting instances infers from some, however, insufficient evi-
dence on a tentatively but, until further evidence, unrestrictedly accepted conclusion, i.e. 
the presumption (Rescher 2006: 27-38). A typical scheme of presumptive reasoning is: 
Presumptive specialisation: 
P1: Fs are normally G. 
P2: a is F.  
P3: a is a normal F. Therefore:  
C: a is G.’  
—where P3 is only an implicit premise. (ibid. 77; 33 f.)  
Some characteristic differences with respect to probabilistic inferences are:  
CHRISTOPH LUMER 
28 
(i) The major premise P1 is not a relative frequency judgement but a predicate logi-
cal general proposition with a restricting condition—in the example: normalcy 
—, which may be precise but which usually is rather open and vague, as e.g. is 
‘normality’ (x(Fx & Nx  Gx)).  
(ii) The conclusion is an unrestricted proposition; it does not contain any modal or 
probabilistic qualification.  
(iii) The implicit premise (P3) makes the inference deductively valid.  
(iv) However, this implicit premise is completely unjustified—in strong contrast to 
what is usually required by epistemic rationality for inferential cognisance.  
 Though theoreticians of presumptive reasoning and default logic think to have 
modelled a specific kind of everyday reasoning, this is probably false: At least somewhat 
epistemically rational people do not take the result of an insecure reasoning procedure to 
be an unrestricted conclusion—in contrast to (ii); instead they add a (vague) quantitative 
or qualitative qualifier to it, like ‘with 90% probability’, ‘most likely’, or ‘presumably’—
in the latter cases quantifications may be added later, if and when necessary. However, 
even if only a minority undertook such qualifications this would be the epistemically ra-
tional way to handle defeasible reasoning; and epistemic rationality is what matters here, 
not typical behaviour. Of course, a justified quantitative, probabilistic qualification of the 
conclusion requires a respective qualification in the major premise P1 too—in contrast to 
(i). However, once having changed the inference so far, i.e. introduced quantitative in-
formation, one can now rely on probabilistic calculations and probabilistic inferences—in 
contrast to (iii)—; there is no need to falsely pretend to know what is unknown: P3—in 
contrast to (iv). Such a transformation of presumptive reasoning into probabilistic infer-
ences presupposes a frequentist analogue P1f to the major premise P1: P1f: ‘x% of the Fs 
are G’. This quantification may be difficult to provide. However, even if we do not know 
precise percentages we can estimate them.  
 Why is this probabilistic reasoning epistemically rational and presumptive rea-
soning not? There are several major advantages of probabilistic inferences with respect to 
presumptive reasoning. 1. Even a qualitative modifier is an important reminder of the 
conclusion’s uncertainty, which as a consequence cannot be used like a certain proposi-
tion as premise for further inferences (in probablistic reasoning the premise remains a 
probability judgement). Further inferences have to transmit also this uncertainty. This is a 
question, at least, of clarity. 2. Not adding a modifier easily leads to contradictions like 
the lottery paradoxon. (If you roll a fair dice the probabilities that ‘1’ results is 1/6; and so 
it is for all the other possible results. With presumptive reasoning, however, you have to 
say that ‘1’ normally does not come up as a result; hence the presumption is: ‘‘1’ will not 
come up’. But so you have to say for ‘2’ and all the other possible results. But this con-
tradicts your true belief that one of the six numbers will be the result of the next roll.) 3. 
A quantitative modifier (even a very vague and unprecise like ‘most likely’ as compared 
e.g. to ‘quite likely’ or ‘rather likely’) permits to compare degrees of justification and 
thus to dismiss the weaker justified beliefs in case of contradicting beliefs. 4. In addition, 
it allows to decide whether the degree of justification is sufficient or whether more in-
formation should be provided for making the belief more certain. 5. And only a quantita-
tive modifier allows to increase the degree of justification even below certainty, e.g. from 
a probability of 0.8 to 0.98. 6. Not disposing of a (frequentistically justified) probabilistic 
quantification leads to ignoring somewhat unlikely risks and chances; in presumptive 
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reasoning these are simply discounted as not existing because they are beyond normalcy; 
hence one cannot take these risks and chances into account in one’s decision—e.g. keep 
one’s hands off options with unlikely but great risks or decide for (repeating) options 
with somewhat unlikely but huge advantages or prepare for the dangers of the unlikely 
but serious consequences—; and this can lead to enormous losses or to losing reachable 
gains. 7. Rescher’s assertions to the contrary notwithstanding (Rescher 2006: 45-53), 
there is no good practical or epistemical justification for presumptive reasoning. The 
main rationale for this conception seems to be only that it captures some ways of every-
day reasoning—which is neither true nor a good justification. To assume the completely 
unjustified tacit premise (P3 in “presumptive specialisation”) in the proposed unqualified 
form to be true is simply irrational; it is pulling the white rabbit of missing informations 
out of the hat. And to accept the unqualified conclusion, hence, is not justified either. 
Frequentist probabilistic reasoning, on the other hand, is practically justified via its in the 
long run good consequences: using the probability judgements in Bayesian decisions, in 
the long run and on the basis of the law of large numbers, will lead to better results than 
any other decision strategy which also disposes only of the same limited information. 
Presumptions (in Rescher’s sense) cannot have this decisive advantage because, being un-
qualified, they simply do not contain the frequentist information presupposed in Bayesian 
decisions. 8. Rescher’s system of presumptive reasoning so far is rather incomplete. It does 
not say anything about how to combine it with other kinds of reasoning or how to justify 
general presumptions.—I think these are sufficient reasons to dismiss presumptive reason-
ing and, hence, also this possibility of a fourth branch of the tree of elementary argument 
schemes. To sum up: not to have empirically found further argument schemes is a weak 
confirmation of the system’s completeness. But more confirmation would be better.  
7.2 Closure of the comet system 
The comet system should be closed in three respects. (i) It should have argumentative 
counterparts to all kinds of cognitions for which such counterparts are possible. (ii) The 
premises of all argument schemes should be possible conclusions of an argument scheme 
belonging again to the system—if the premise is not of such a type that it can be recog-
nised only in a way which has no argumentative counterpart (cases in kind are observa-
tion and introspection, which, however, do not exclude indirect ways of arguing for ob-
servational and first-person mental propositions). Put differently: For all the types of 
premises mentioned in the description of the argument schemes holds: this type of prem-
ise can be argued for with the help of an argument that is captured by the system—unless 
the premise is of a type that can be recognised only in such a way that has no argumenta-
tive counterpart. (iii) It should be possible to justify all the proposed argument schemes 
with the help of an argument covered by the system.  
 With respect to the first two kinds of closures (i and ii) the following holds. 
There are several forms of direct verification: empirical observation, introspection, prac-
tical evaluation and inferences (on the basis of logical operators). Empirical observation 
and introspection have no argumentative counterpart because they are not merely verbal 
but require a certain personal situation. The other kinds of direct verification instead have 
their argumentative counterparts in the system of argument schemes: practical and deduc-
tive arguments. In addition, there are indirect forms of cognitions: in particular probabil-
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istic reasoning and practical justifications of theoretical propositions; these, of course, 
have argumentative counterparts included in the list: probabilistic and Pascal arguments. 
With respect to the third kind of closure (justification of the argument schemes), instead the 
following holds. The comet system includes several argument schemes by which types of 
arguments and cognition can be justified: practical justifications of technical-constructive 
theories, arguments for evaluations based on adequacy conditions and Pascal arguments. 
These argument types are sufficient to justify all valid kinds of arguments and cogni-
tions.—Closure, however, offers only a very weak confirmation of the completeness.  
7.3 Theoretical considerations 
The only positive “proof” of the system’s completeness probably are theoretical consid-
erations about possible argument types. I cannot offer a real proof of this kind but only 
something much weaker, speculations in favour of the completeness. For assessing the 
possibilities of further branches of argument schemes, first of all the role of the three in-
cluded branches has to be envisioned. Deductive arguments rely on deductive relations, 
which are based on the logical operators. They are the only certain types of arguments, 
even though they unfold their full epistemic potential only in combination with uncertain 
types of arguments, which provide premises that for reasons of epistemic accessibility 
could not be proved deductively, in particular universal empirical laws. Practical argu-
ments, in principle, could be definitoric arguments with the definition of ‘prospect desira-
bility’ as their major premise. However the informational requirements of this definition 
are so far-reaching that the resulting arguments must remain approximate and probabilis-
tic. Finally, probabilistic arguments from the very beginning have been introduced for 
providing uncertain but helpful information as a substitute in cases where certain cogni-
tion is impossible or too expensive. This role, of being an uncertain substitute, leads to 
non-monotonicity and data dependency. 
 Now, can there be further fundamental types of cognition and arguments, i.e. 
further branches with these or similar roles? 1. The facts that deductive arguments are 
based on logical operators, i.e. something deeply embedded in our language, and that in 
the course of 2500 years of epistemological research no other certain type of argument 
has been discovered make it very unlikely that there is such a further certain type of ar-
gument schemes. 2. I cannot exclude that there is or will be another standard argument 
scheme originating in the unattainability or impossibility of properly handling the huge 
mass of information needed or desired in certain standard situations (as is the case with 
practical arguments) and whose independency from the other schemes is based on the 
special way of handling the unavoidable incompleteness by flexible forms of approxima-
tion. However, if such approximations are needed only now and then one might help one-
self by combining several forms of arguments that include e.g. mathematical approxima-
tion or probabilistic estimates without introducing a new branch of argument schemes. 
What makes practical arguments different in this respect and hence has led to establishing 
an independent branch of argument schemes are, first, the ubiquity and urgency of the 
epistemic problem they are answering, namely decisions about actions, and, second, the 
existence of everyday forms of reasoning by pondering the advantages and disadvantages 
of several options which cry out for an epistemological backing and refinement. It is un-
likely that conditions as strong as these will be fulfilled in other contexts. 3. I cannot ex-
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clude, too, that there are or will be developed further branches of uncertain argument 
schemes beyond probabilistic arguments which infer from insufficient evidence to infor-
mationally stronger theses. However, all the schemes proposed so far in the literature 
have been found defective: abduction, conduction, Walton’s presumptive reasoning, 
Rescher’s plausible and presumptive reasoning, nonmonotonic logics like default logic or 
paraconsistent logic (which have not been discussed here). A general problem of such 
proposals is a lack of an epistemological backing and, in most cases, the inability to dif-
ferentiate various degrees of uncertain justification. Probability theory instead has several 
advantages for which new schemes to be proposed should provide equivalent advantages: 
probabilistic arguments have solid epistemological underpinnings, namely probability 
theory; probability attributions have a frequentist foundation; decision theory has found 
second-best solutions for cases where we do not even have an empirical basis for attrib-
uting empirically frequentist probabilities, namely to use Laplace probabilities instead; 
probabilistic arguments make you pay the ampliative increase in (however not surely 
justified) information by a quantified reduction of certainty, i.e. probability degrees; the 
immense usefulness of this kind of specifiedly uncertain information has been proved in 
decision theory: in the long run, (normal) decisions according to expected desirability 
lead to the best results when taken together. Therefore, the hurdles for additional branch-
es of insecure argument schemes are high.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For more than a decade, Cristoph Lumer has argued for an epistemological approach to 
argumentation (cf. Lumer 1990, 1991, 1997, 2000, 2003, and 2005a/b). This differs from 
what he calls rhetorical and consensual approaches in that the former take persuasion, 
broadly defined, to be the goal of argumentation while the latter take consensus as the 
goal. The epistemological approach, though, takes knowledge, or at least justified belief 
as the proper result of argumentation. In the paper under consideration, Lumer continues 
his argument for such an approach first by criticizing a popular current approach to ar-
gumentation schemes, and then by offering an alternative typology. In what follows, I 
examine several general criticisms Lumer offers against the current state of research into 
argumentation schemes. If these criticisms are meant as defeaters of the current state of 
research, then it is important that any proposed alternatives avoid these criticisms. Se-
cond, I consider Lumer’s particular criticisms of Walton, Reed and Macagno’s recent 
work on argumentation schemes. I argue that some of his criticisms can be easily an-
swered, while others, indeed perhaps the strongest criticism, cannot. Finally, I raise sev-
eral critical questions about the particular typology Lumer offers. 
2. ON LUMER’S GENERAL CRITICISMS OF CURRENT  
RESEARCH ON SCHEMES 
Professor Lumer traces current research on argumentation schemes to Aristotle. He rightly 
notes that the result of the current research collects lists of interrelated strategies or recipes 
regarding the proper ways to argue. Against this approach, he finds three problems. 
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[F]irst, that the lists of resulting schemes are long, often very long, never complete and al-
ways arbitrary. Second, today’s approaches should not be contentual but formal, thereby ex-
plaining the contents. Third, there is no (more general) theory behind these lists of schemes, 
which could explain and guarantee their validity or some other form of value as well as bring 
us nearer to a really complete list. (Lumer 2011: 1) 
Let’s divide the first problem into its component parts. (1) The lists are often very long. (2) 
The lists are never complete. (3) The lists are always arbitrary. The first component of this 
problem—that the lists are very long—makes trouble for users of these lists. Insofar as 
proponents of schemes claim that usefulness is a benefit to the approach, this is a problem 
for the application of schemes. The length of the lists, however, stems, perhaps, from an-
other issue; but more on that later. The lack of completeness for the lists can also be a prob-
lem for applications of schemes to arguments on the hoof, to borrow a phrase from Woods. 
Neither of these is insuperable, however. The last component of this problem—the arbitrar-
iness of the list – is theoretically troubling. The issue, of course, is that for any entry on the 
list, if the list is arbitrarily composed, there is no principled reason for including or exclud-
ing the entry. One would hope that every entry finds support in some principle or other. 
This arbitrariness also explains why the lists are very long and never complete.  
 The second problem Lumer has with current approaches to schemes is that such 
approaches focus on content rather than form. To see that this is the case, consider the 
form of the separate schemes Argument from Established Rule (Walton et al. 2008: 343) 
and Rhetorical Argument from Descriptive Schemes (Walton et al. 2008: 318). The form 
of both schemes is modus ponens; hence, they are differentiated by content. Perhaps ap-
proaches that focus on form will avoid the problems listed above. 
 The last general problem for the contemporary approaches is the lack of a gen-
eral theory underwriting the lists. Walton (2005) suggests that this is roughly correct. 
During the question period, Wen Xue-Feng, a PhD student, asked an interesting question: how 
were the argumentation schemes constructed? I took this question to ask not just about where 
the schemes come from, but also about their justification. I replied that the schemes came from 
studying many examples of arguments, especially ones associated with informal fallacies, and 
from finding patterns and structure common to these arguments. (Walton 2005: 1-2) 
The approach is somewhat empirical—one looks at examples of arguments to find com-
mon patterns and structures. The results of such inquiry will skew depending upon the 
actual examples investigated. This doesn’t undermine the lists, but it might explain both 
the arbitrariness and incompleteness of lists so derived. 
 As these problems are explicitly mentioned, one will expect Lumer’s alternative 
approach to avoid, or at the least to respond to such problems.  
3. PARTICULAR PROBLEMS FOR WALTON AND COMPANY 
I bypass Lumer’s discussion of Kienpointer’s system of schemes because, “as compared 
with Kienpointer’s system, at least prima facie, considerable progress has been made.” 
(Lumer 2011: 5) But this progress is apparent rather than real, at least according to Lu-
mer. A first point against Walton & company’s approach regards the format of the 
schemes. The schemes are generally given by two related components: the form of the 
argument and critical questions. The form is typically syllogistic. The critical questions 
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evaluate the associated argument, usually as a function of the particular content of the 
scheme. So, for example, in the scheme for Argument from Expert Opinion (Walton et al. 
2008: 310), the critical questions regard the extent of the expertise, the credibility of the 
purported expert, etc. One problem Lumer sees with this method is that the questions, at 
least when they aren’t addressing the general acceptability of the premises, concerns ma-
terial that ought to be in the premises of the argument. Thinking again of the Argument 
from Expert Opinion, that the purported expert is an expert ought to be included in any 
such argument. Hence, at least according to Lumer (2011: 5), the answers to the critical 
questions should be included in the standard form of the argument as premises. 
 In answer to this problem—why not make the content of all critical questions into 
premises—one can note that in contexts where one might appeal to an Argument from Ex-
pert Opinion, for example, the critical questions might be doing work other than supplying 
premises. The critical questions, perhaps, indicate presumption, burden or onus. Hence, the 
asking of a particular critical question can or will produce an argumentative burden on the 
part of the arguer. This answer, as we will see below, opens a different problem. 
 Lumer notes that by appealing to the critical questions as questions, the schematic 
approach assumes a dialogical situation. He finds this problematical. For example, in philos-
ophy we often consider the arguments of those who are long dead. There is no possibility of 
asking Plato, say, whether he really considered Euthyphro an expert. But this problem, too, 
isn’t insuperable. One can assume that the interlocutor is ideal or abstract rather than real. 
Hence, though Plato may not be available to answer critical questions, one might be able to 
determine whether an advocate of a Platonic position could answer such a question. Or, in 
cases where I advance an argument to myself, I can act as both arguer and recipient.  
 As noted above regarding these approaches generally, in the particular case of 
Walton et al.’s compendium, the list is incomplete. Lumer notes: there are no probabilis-
tic schemes, that the list of deductive schemes is incomplete, and that there are no 
schemes for uniquely scientific contexts. What is worse, at least for Lumer, many of the 
schemes are superfluous insofar as they employ the same form – usually a form of modus 
ponens. This combination of problems is probably insuperable given the biggest problem 
for Walton et al.’s approach: no general theory of schemes. 
 I’m not sure how fair the criticism is. On the one hand, it is true that Walton et 
al.’s approach is bottom-up, as it takes the investigation of reasoning to be the source of 
the discovery of new schemes. It isn’t top-down: starting with general principles from 
which to derive new schemes. So, though there is no theory in the grand sense, there is a 
method. Moreover, when we look at Lumer’s own proposal, we will see that having a 
theory doesn’t guarantee completeness. 
4. THE POSITIVE ACCOUNT AND SOME CONCLUDING QUESTIONS 
Professor Lumer’s positive account comes in two stages. In the first stage, he suggests an 
alternative classificatory system, one which finds its source in the terminology of chemistry. 
Thus, at the bottom, Lumer gives us elementary arguments; from these molecular arguments 
can be constructed and so on. There can be compounds of molecular arguments as well as 
branches of compounds, etc. The goal is to classify a wide variety of argument types. 
 The real novelty in the approach, however, comes in the second stage. Lumer 
contends that on epistemological principles it makes sense to have three sources for one’s 
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elementary argument schemes: deduction, probability and practical rationality. These 
sources are formal rather than content-driven. By making these the sources, one has an 
easy explanation for the overall methodology: each of these sources, when properly em-
ployed, can be used in the justification of claims. Hence, the output of argumentation will 
be knowledge claims or at least justified beliefs. 
 Let’s focus on the most straightforward examples of schemes. In reporting on 
what a deductive scheme would include, Professor Lumer distinguishes four elements of a 
deductive scheme. First, there is the form. In one sense, all deductive schemes have the 
same form: “r1, …, rn t.” In this form, each r is a reason and t is the thesis or conclusion. 
Second, there is what Lumer calls the “guarantee of truth.” This includes the claim that all 
of the reasons are true and that the set {r1, …, rn} entails t. From these two elements, t’s 
truth is assured. Third, there is “adequacy in principle.” Lumer describes this as follows. 
There is at least one person who at a certain time justifiedly believes that the reasons r1, …, rn 
are acceptable but who does not justifiedly believe this about the thesis. (Lumer 2011: 14) 
Fourth, the scheme contains elements associated with what Lumer calls “situational ade-
quacy.” This includes both elements of the argument’s recipient’s rationality as well as 
the acceptance and intelligibility of the argument for the recipient. Application to an ar-
gument on the hoof seems the best way to evaluate the utility of such schemes. So, con-
sider the following passage. 
[I]f utilitarianism is true, […] then it is better that people should not believe in utilitarianism. 
If, on the other hand, it is false, then it is certainly better that people should not believe in it. 
So, either way, it is better that people should not believe in it. (Williams 1972: 107) 
Let r1 be, “If utilitarianism is true, then it is better that people should not believe in utili-
tarianism.” Let r2 be, “If utilitarianism is false, then it is better that people should not be-
lieve in utilitarianism.” And let t be, “It is better that people should not believe in utilitar-
ianism.” The form, so far, is “r1, r2  t.” As regards Lumer’s guarantee of truth, there are 
two elements to consider. First, are the reasons true? Second, do the reasons entail the 
conclusion? As regards the former questions, let’s grant that the reasons are true. Yet, for 
the second question, there is the missing, but not quite unstated reason, “Either utilitarian-
ism is true or it is false.” Adding this element guarantees that the reasons entail the con-
clusion. But, is it true? Leave the answer to that as homework for a course on truth. What 
about Lumer’s adequacy in principle? Is there someone who at a certain time is justified 
in believing that the reasons are acceptable but who is not justified in believing that the 
conclusion is acceptable? It would seem that this is possible only for someone who is not 
familiar with the argument under consideration, at least if the argument is deductive. Fi-
nally, there is Lumer’s situational adequacy. Is the target of the argument rational? 
Would the argument be intelligible to that target? Answering each of these questions will 
give us a measure of the argument’s success for a given target.  
 Is this a schematic approach to argumentation? I think it is more like a meta-
schematic approach. Consider the role of logical or argumentative form. Lumer notes: 
the description of the form of deductive arguments is empty in the sense that all arguments 
fall under this description. This holds because of the polymorphism of deductive argument, 
which does not permit any more specific description. (Lumer 2011: 14) 
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Yet, this only holds at the level above what we might term specific schemes. I would have 
thought that one could differentiate the form of the particular deductive schemes through 
the form of the individual reasons in the scheme. Hence, there will be deductive schemes 
that contain conditionals, schemes that contain disjunctions, schemes that contain nega-
tions, etc. Moreover, there are schemes that are combinations of disjunctions and condi-
tionals, or combinations of disjunctions and negations, or what-have-you. Indeed, in the 
deductive cases, we have names for most of the common argumentative patterns: modus po-
nens, modus tollens, constructive dilemma, etc. Of course, what unites these schemes is their 
deductive base. The deductive meta-scheme should have all of the elements Lumer mentions, 
but there will be unique particular questions associated with each of the different forms. For 
example, a scheme that includes conditional elements should answer whether the condition-
als are indicative or subjunctive, as this will matter to whether the reasons entail the conclu-
sion. Some theories of counterfactual conditionals, for example, deny that modus tollens is 
generally valid for such conditional types. Similar questions would apply to disjunctions, 
generalizations and the like. The resulting list of schemes, though, will have many of the 
faults Lumer raises against Walton & company’s lists. Lumer’s list will be incomplete. The 
choice to include, say, modus ponens, would probably be based upon its frequent use and not 
upon the principle that makes it valid. Moreover, unless one stays at the meta-schematic lev-
el, the lengths of the lists will grow quite large. 
 Of course, Lumer’s account has the great advantage that it has a general theory 
underwriting the lists themselves. Hence, though whether to include an obscure deductive 
inference as a particular scheme will be a matter of personal choice rather than theoretical 
underpinning, such choices do not undermine the theoretical perspective. Hence, Lumer’s 
account is an improvement over merely empirical accounts of schemes. 
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